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APPLE COMPUTER, INC. u. FRANKLIN 
COMPUTER CORPORATION PUTS THE BYTE 
BACK INTO COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR 
COMPUTER PROGRAMS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A. The Problem: Protection for Computer Software 
The computer is becoming more a part of our lives, from 
leisure to business, education and science. For a computer to 
perform such varied tasks, programs must be written. The need 
for thes~ programs has created an enormous industry for their 
development, sales, and implementation, and, as a consequence, 
there is a need by the creators of software to protect their pro-
prietary interests. 1 Because the development of a computer pro-
gram is so costly, the unlicensed use and sale of such software 
deprives its owners of rightful profits and decreases the incen-
tive to invest in the development of programs.! Thus, while 
some form of reliable legal protection should be available to pro-
prietors of software, the traditional legal remedies found in 
copyright, patent and trade secret have been questioned as to 
whether they guarantee effective protection against mis-
appropriation. 8 
While the law has developed in favor of protection for com-
puter software, until recently there has been substantial argu-
ment over which type of protection should govern the various 
phases and types of computer programs! The Third Circuit's 
decision in Apple Computer, Inc. u. Franklin Computer Corp-
oration" is significant because it held that all computer pro-
1. Software is the generic name for programs. 
2. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula International, Inc., 562 F. Supp. 775, 781-82 
(C.D. Cal. 1983), aff'd, No. 83-5875, slip op. (9th Cir. Feb. 8, 1984) [hereinafter cited as 
Formula]; Final Report of the National Commission on New Technological Uses of 
Copyrighted Works 10-11 (July 31, 1978) (available in Golden Gate University School of 
Law Library) [hereinafter cited as CONTU Report]. 
3. See infra note 7. There is the ever-increasing problem of knowing when a pro-
gram has been misappropriated. Larson, Stiffened Software-Copyright Protection By 
the Court Isn't Expected to Thwart Pirates, WALL. ST. J., Sept. 6, 1983, at 2, col. 2. 
4. See infra text accompanying notes 58-95, 107-122. 
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grams, whether expressed in object code embedded in ROM or 
expressed as an operating program, are copyrightable subject 
matter.s Thus, by granting copyright protection to all programs, 
the Franklin opinion has helped stabilize copyright law in rela-
tion to computer software and has allowed copyright to become 
the most effective, most easily obtainable, and most preferred 
form of legal protection· for computer programs.' 
6. Id. at 1253-54. See infra text accompanying notes 11-29 for an explanation of 
these computer terms. 
7. Trade secret protection is not as effective as copyright since if the program's con-
tent is discovered by another and publicly displayed, trade secrecy ends. Most computer 
programs are mass distributed to the public for use in their own computers. The user can 
easily view the program instructions and, thus, the content of the program is no longer 
kept secret. This rules out trade secrecy protection for a large segment of the computer 
software market. The software proprietor who desires trade secret protection is usually 
limited to signing personal licensing agreements with a small identified user market. 
Brief for Amicus Curiae Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. at 6, 
Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3rd Cir. 1983) [herein-
after cited as ADAPSO Brief]. See Keplinger, Computer Software-Its Nature and Its 
Protection, 30 EMORY L.J. 483, 492 (1981) for a discussion on trade secrecy protection. 
Likewise, patent protection could extend to computer software if the program were 
characterized as an idea or a process, but such a program would have to meet the rigor-
ous tests of utility, novelty, and non-obviousness to be patentable. This is a stringent 
standard applied by the Patent Office which very few ideas can meet. Even if a program 
does meet this test, it has not yet been settled in the courts whether computer programs 
are even patentable. Franklin, 714 F.2d at 1251. In Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 
(1981), the United States Supreme Court held only that a patent invention_was not un-
patentable because it used a computer program. See infra text accompanying notes 86-
93. Programs in general are not considered to be ideas; however, if there are so few ways 
to express an idea, so that to protect the expression would also protect the idea, the 
expression is considered to have merged with the idea and patent protection is 
appropriate. 
Patent is also an unmanageable form of protection, for a computer program is con-
stantly revised in order to "debug," improve, or incorporate new features. A new patent 
may have to be filed after every major revision. As a consequence, this slows down the 
development of new programs and discourages upgrading them. Also, it takes several 
years between the time the program is registered and a status of patent is granted. Dur-
ing this time, legal remedies are not available, and by the time the patent is granted, the 
program will have almost certainly gone through a revision. Copyright, on the other 
hand, allows the new revision to be separately copyrighted the instant it is fixed in a 
tangible medium, and enforcement by court order becomes possible when a copy is filed 
with the Copyright Office. Therefore, legal remedies are instantly available to the owner 
of a copyrighted program and when actual injury is difficult to prove, copyright provides 
a statutory damage award for copyright infringement regardless of whether there was 
actual monetary damage. Thus, copyright may be the only chance one has to recover a 
monetary damage award and to receive immediate injunctive relief. 
In addition, under the Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. section 302, copyright pro-
tection exists for the life of the author plus fifty years, and if the programmer has been 
hired to create the work, protection extends to seventy-five years from. the date of the 
original publication or 100 years from the date of the original creation of the program. In 
contrast, patent will protect a computer program for only seventeen years and limits the 
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This Note presents the areas in which the copyrightability 
of a computer program has been questioned and it explains the 
reasoning used by the Third Circuit in Franklin to reject argu-
ments that not all computer programs are copyrightable.8 Al-
though there is no longer any doubt whether a computer pro-
gram may be the subject of copyright, fundamental issues 
involved in copyrighting a work may pose barriers to a program 
being protected.9 These issues will be discussed in light of the 
Third Circuit's opinion in Franklin and the future directions 
which copyright law may take.10 
B. The Logistics of Computer Software 
To grasp software protection issues it is necessary to under-
stand the computer concepts behind the debate. "Computer 
hardware" is the "mechanical, magnetic, electrical, and elec-
tronic parts" to a computer ,11 made up of the central processing 
unit (CPU), which does the actual processing of the programs 
and data, and peripheral devices which input, output and store 
this information.12 In contrast, "computer software" refers to the 
right of another to independently develop the Sanle progranl based on the Sanle idea, 
while copyright allows competitors to develop the Sanle progranl independently. 
Internationally, patents are not often recognized and when they are, a patent must 
be separately obtained in that country according to their procedures. In contrast, copy-
right automatically protects the copyrighted work in almost every industrialized nation. 
ADAPSO Brief, supra, at 7-9. See Root, Protecting Computer Software in the '80's: 
Practical Guidelines for Evolving Needs, 8 RUTGERS COMPUTER AND TECHNOLOGY L.J. 
205, 225-230 (1981); Keplinger, supra note 7, at 484-493, for a discussion of the recent 
United States Supreme Court decisions on patent protection. See CONTU Report, supra 
note 2, at 16, where in analyzing the protection provided by patent, trade secret, and 
unfair competition, CONTU stated that these forms of protection inhibit the dissemina-
tion of information and restrict competition to a greater extent than copyright. 
8. See infra text accompanying notes 58-100. 
9. See infra note 126 and accompanying text. 
10. See infra text accompanying notes 123-126. 
11. H. KATZAN, JR., INTRODUCTION TO COMPUTERS AND DATA PROCESSING 23 (1979). 
12. J. FRATES & W. MOLDRUP, INTRODUCTION TO THE COMPUTER: AN INTEGRATIVE AP-
PROACH 96 (1980). 
Presently, a progranl can be input by means of either a keyboard terminal, a 
punched card reader, a punched tape reader, a magnetic tape or disk unit, a magnetic 
character reader, or an optical scanner. Id. The information is output by using either a 
printer device or the Sanle devices that were used to input the information. Id. at 99. 
Audio input and output devices are being developed. R. VERZELLO & J. REUTTER, III, 
DATA PROCESSING SYSTEMS AND CONCEPTS 152 (1982). 
Information is either stored internally, linked directly to the CPU in a magnetic 
core, on magnetic film or on monolithic memory chips, or outside the CPU in an auxil-
iary or external storage device. Auxiliary storage devices, such as magnetic disks, tapes, 
3
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set of instructions, or the "program," which the programmer 
writes in order to tell the computer what to do; the software 
makes the hardware run to solve a given problem. IS Thus, com-
puter hardware is no more than idle machine equipment with 
the potential to perform actual processing of given instructions. 
once a software program has been input into the computer 
hardware. H 
There are two types of computer software: "operating pro-
grams" which direct the internal operations of the computer, 
and "application programs" which direct the computer to solve 
specific user problems.1II The function of the operating program 
is to control the execution of application programs and allow the 
hardware to be utilized efficiently. IS Thus, wh~n an application 
program is written, the programmer need only concern himself 
with setting up the instructions to solve a specific user-oriented 
problem, such as producing images on a video screen or calculat-
ing a mathematical problem. An operating system program, a 
type of operating program, enables the computer to schedule 
work in the most efficient manner possible by supervising the 
overall operation of the computer, controlling the input and out-
put devices, controlling the flow of the program or data through 
the computer, and managing where the program or data will be 
stored and retrieved when needed. The programmer is thereby 
drums, film or cards are located outside the CPU, but are connected to it, while external 
storage devices are not even connected to the CPU. Common external memory devices 
are floppy disks, punched cards, paper tape, magnetic tape, and magnetic disks. J. 
FRATES & W. MOLDRUP, supra at 97. Storage devices are also referred to as memory 
devices. See R. VERZELLO & J. REUTJ'ER, III, supra at 193-222, for more detail. 
13. H. KATZAN, JR., supra note 11, at 83; J. FRATES & W. MOLDRUP supra note 12, at 
241. CONTU has defined a computer program as "a set of statements or instructions to 
be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain result." 
CONTU Report, supra note 2, at 12. This was the definition later adopted by the legisla-
ture in the Act of December 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 96th Cong., 94 Stat. 3015, 3028 
(codified in 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1980)), see infra text accompanying notes 36-37. 
Do not confuse an algorithm with a program. An algorithm is a specific set of rules 
for solving a problem, while a program is a set of instructions open to variation which is 
written in a specially formulated language to achieve the programmer's desired result. A 
computer program can be comprised of a variety of algorithms. J. FRATES & W. MOLDUP, 
supra note 12, at 427-428. 
14. R. VERZELLO & J. REUTTER, III, supra note 12, at 230; J. FRATES & W. MOLDRUP, 
supra note 12, at 242. 
15. J. FRATES & W. MOLDRUP, supra note 12, at 242. These terms are also referred 
to as applications software and operations software. [d. 
16. [d. at 240. 
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relieved of these "housekeeping" functions. 17 
Software is usually first written in source code. Source code 
is known as a "high-level" computer language because it is in an 
English-like symbolic form. Consequently, by writing the set of 
instructions in source code, the programmer's job is greatly sim-
plified. There are several hundred such high-level programming 
languages, such as FORTRAN, BASIC, COBOL and PASCAL.t8 
Next, the assembler-compiler program (also part of the opera-
tions software) translates the source code into "machine lan-
guage," a combination of "ones" and "zeros" known as the ob-
ject code. The assembler language takes the English-like source 
code and converts it into its machine language equivalent.19 Fin-
ally, the object code, the binary form of the program, communi-
cates directly with the computer hardware by translating the 
machine language into a series of electrical impulses allowing the 
computer to solve the problem.20 
For example, the word ADD is a symbolic version of a pro-
gram instruction in source code. The assembler-compiler pro-
gram converts the mnemonic symbol ADD into its binary 
equivalent of 0001. The translated version 0001 is now in object 
code. The binary symbol 0001 will then send an electrical im-
pulse to the CPU telling the computer to add. When the 
processing of the program is complete, a similar process occurs 
to convert the program's results back into English-like readable 
form. Note, however, that each phase of the program, whether in 
source code or object code, is an accurate rendition of the com-
puter program with the capacity to be printed out and read.21 
The ability to understand the writing, whether it be in source 
code or object code, depends on the training of the reader.22 
17. Id. at 242-243. 
18. R. VERZELLO & J. REU'M'ER, III, supra note 12, at 260. Traditionally, the first 
phase was the development of a flow chart; a schematic presentation of the program's 
logic or the steps involved in order to solve the problem. Today, 8ince programmers use 
interactive keyboards with terminal screens, it is rarely necessary for a programmer to 
work the problem through this stage. If flow charts are used, they are reduced to source 
code by the programmer. 
19. Id. at 262. Although it is a tedious task, a program can be written in object code. 
20. Id. at 260-262. 
21. KOCh, Copyright-Intellectual Property in the Information Age, 21 JURIMETRICS 
J. 345, 353 (1980-81). 
22. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 545 F. Supp. 812, 821 (E.n. 
Pa. 1982), rev'd, 714 F.2d 1240 (3rd Cir. 1983). 
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Often computer programs, while in object code, are im-
printed onto silicon chips and stored internally within the CPU. 
This saves one the trouble of copying the program from the 
computer's memory banks into the CPU each time the program 
is needed and is especially helpful with programs that need to be 
run frequently or quickly.2s This memory device is referred to as 
Read Only Memory (ROM), because it is a particular microcir-
cuit configuration on a silicon chip that can hold an object code 
program permanently so that the program cannot be changed or 
erased.1I4 
Unlike ROMs, Random Access Memory (RAM), another 
type of memory device, allows the stored programs or data to be 
altered as desired.211 The user can read the program into the 
memory, read it back out, and change or erase it at will.26 When 
the program is in this RAM state it is volatile, meaning that 
when the power to the device is turned off, all the information 
contained within the RAM is lost. ROM, on the other hand, is 
nonvolatile because the program has been imprinted onto the 
memory chip.27 
When the computer program is "in ROM," that is, when the 
software is placed on this hardware element, the configuration is 
sometimes referred to as "firmware," so named because the ob-
ject code program is made "firm" by imprinting it onto the 
ROM chip.28 The term firmware is misleading, insofar as it im-
plies that programs in ROM are different than programs in 
RAM. ROM can be programmed in the same languages and with 
23. R. VERZELLO & J. REUTl'ER, III, supra note 12, at 181. 
24. J. FRATES & W. MOLDRuP, supra note 12, at 353-354; R. VERZELLO & J. REUTl'ER, 
III, supra note 12, at 180. Programmable Read Only Memory (PROM) is a similar mem-
ory device, but differs from ROM in that the program is placed on the silicon chip after 
its manufacture. Like ROM, once the program is imprinted onto the PROM the program 
cannot be changed or erased, but there are also Erasable Programmable Read Only 
Memory devices (EPROM) which do allow the program to be erased or reprogrammed. 
These are all ROMs of one sort or another and for simplicity they will all be referred to 
as "ROMs." See Franklin, 714 F.2d at 1243, citing the lower court, 545 F. Supp. at 813. 
25. J. FRATES & W. MOLDRuP, supra note 12, at 353-354; R. VERZELLO & J. REUTI'ER, 
III, supra note 12, at 181. 
26. J. FRATES & W. MOLDRUP, supra note 12, at 353. 
27.1d. 
28. M. Carrington & J. Pooley, Advanced Business Law Series Protection of Tech-
nology 20 (Jan./Feb. 1983) (California Continuing Education of the Bar Program 
Material). 
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the same instructions as RAM.29 The only essential difference 
between the two is that ROM is a nonvolatile memory device 
and RAM is volatile. 
The overwhelming majority of the courts, including the 
Third Circuit in Franklin, have interpreted Congress' directive 
under the Federal Copyright Act to include all computer pro-
grams as copyrightable. In order to understand how the courts 
have come to this conclusion, a brief discussion of the evolution 
of the Copyright Act as it relates to computer programs is 
necessary.30 
C. Historical Overview 
In 1976, Congress wrote a comprehensive reVISIon of the 
Copyright Act of 1909,31 but the new act did not specifically ad-
dress what copyright protection was to be afforded computer 
programs.32 This was because the National Commission on New 
Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTU), created by 
Congress to study the matter of copyright protection for com-
puter programs,33 had not completed its study.a. Therefore, com-
29. Id. See Kirchner, Not Eligible for Patent Honeywell Firmware is Software: u.S. 
Brief, COMPUTERWORLD, July 21, 1980, at 10, who points out that the United States Pat-
ent and Trademark Office and Court of Customs and Patent Appeals considers that 
firmware is software, rather than being considered something in between software and 
hardware. 
30. For a detailed review on the history of the issue, see Comment, Protection of 
Proprietary Rights in Computer Programs: A "Basic" Formula for Debugging the Sys-
tem, 57 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 92 (1982); Rose, Protection of Intellectual Property Rights in 
Computers and Computer Programs: Recent Developments, 9 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 547 
(1981-1982); Keplinger, Computer Software-Its Nature and Its Protection, 30 EMORY 
L.J. 483 (1981); Root, Protecting Computer Software in the '80's: Practical Guidelines 
for Evolving Needs, 8 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECHNOLOGY L.J. 205 (1980-1981); Koch, 
Copyright-Intellectual Property in the Information Age, 21 JURIMETRICS J. 345 (1980-
1981); Koenig, Software Copyright: The Conflict Within CONTU, 27 BULL. COPYRIGHT 
SOC'y OF THE U.S.A. 340 (1980). 
31. Act of October 19, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553,90 Stat. 2541 (codified as 17 U.S.C. 
§§ 101-810) [hereinafter cited as the 1976 Act). 
32. CONTU Report, supra note 2, at 1. See S. REP. No. 473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. R. 
(1975); H. R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. R. (1976); H.R. REP. No. 1733, 94th 
Cong., 2d Sess. R. (1976), where Congress considered the matter and decided that it 
needed more information. 
33. Act of December 31, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-573, section 201, 88 Stat. 1873 (1974). 
34. CONTU Report, supra note 2, at 1; Koenig, supra note 30, at 340. 
CONTU was created by the 93rd Congress in 1974, through the Library of Congress, 
as part of the effort to revise the present copyright laws. CONTU was to make recom-
7
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puter programs were not explicitly defined as copyrightable 
under the 1976 Act, and section 117 was enacted to maintain 
past copyright law as it related to the scope of protection to be 
accorded copyrighted works when input into a computer.311 
mendations for changes in copyright law or procedure that were found necessary to as-
sure public access to copyrighted works used in conjunction with computer and machine 
duplication, and to provide recognition of the rights of copyright owners. CONTU Re-
port, supra note 2, at 1. The eleven members of CONTU were appointed by the Presi-
dent, and were to be composed of authors and other copyright owners, users of copy-
righted works, and the general public. At least one member was to be an expert in 
consumer protection affairs. 
CONTU studied two broad areas involving computers and copyright: the creation of 
new works with computer assistance and the use of copyrighted works in conjunction 
with computers. In relation to the latter category, CONTU considered the placement 
into computers of any copyrighted works, the use of automated data bases, and copy-
right protection for the intellectual property in computer programs. CONTU Report, 
supra note 2, at 9. CONTU recognized the importance of making copyright an available 
means of protection for computer programs. CONTU Report, supra note 2, at 11. On 
July 31, 1978, CONTU submitted its recommendations in a final report to Congress. See 
infra text accompanying notes 36-40. 
35. Franklin, 714 F.2d 1240, 1247 (3rd Cir. 1983); Tandy Corp. v. Personal Micro 
Computer, 524 F. Supp. 171, 174-75 (N.D. Cal. 1981) [hereinafter cited as Tandy]. Ac-
cord Williams Electronics, Inc. v. Artic International, Inc., 685 F.2d 870, 877 (3rd Cir. 
1982) [hereinafter cited as Williams]. 
This version of section 117 reads: 
Scope of exclusive rights: Use in conjunction with computers 
and similar information systems. 
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 through 116 
and 118, this title does not afford to the owner of copyright in 
a work any greater or lesser rights with respect to the use of 
the work in conjunction with automatic systems capable of 
storing, processing, retrieving, or transferring information, or 
in conjunction with any similar device, machine or process, 
than those afforded to works under the law, whether Title 17 
or the common law or statutes of a state, if in effect on De-
cember 31, 1977, as held applicable and construed by a court 
in an action brought under this title. 
17 U.S.C. § 117 (1976), repealed by Act of December 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 
Stat. 3015 (1980), (codified as 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1980». See infra note 38 for new section 
117. 
The Copyright Office was originally uncertain whether computer programs were to 
be afforded copyright protection, but the Office had a policy of resolving doubtful issues 
in favor of registration. United States Copyright Office, Announcement, 11 BULL. OF THE 
COPYRIGHT SOC'Y OF THE U.S.A. 361 (1964). Thus, in 1964, the Copyright Office began to 
accept computer programs for copyright registration. The Office, however, applied its 
"Rule of Doubt" policy to all registered programs. The Rule of Doubt permitted the 
registration of a computer program as a copyrightable work when there was no law on 
the subject, but the Copyright Office advised the author that the legitimacy of the regis-
tration was in doubt. Bigelow, Special Report: PTO Issues Guidelines for Software Ex-
aminations; Copyright Office Finalized Notice Rules, Objects to Object Code, 8 No. 6 
COMPUTER LAW AND TAX REPORT 4 (1982). Bigelow explains that the Copyright Office 
will not accept the object code program as the filed registered copy if a source code copy 
8
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On December 12, 1980, Congress amended the 1976 Act to 
include CONTU's recommendations,36 specifically the addition 
of CaNTU's' definition of a computer program to section lOp7 
and the repeal and replacement of old section 117 with entirely 
new language addressing the rights of computer program owners 
to make back-up and archival copies.38 The legislature did not 
can be made and filed. This is due to the difficulty the copyright examiners have in 
trying to decide whether a program contains copyrightable authorship when the program 
is in all ones and zeros. Prior to this rule, there had been a tendency to file the object 
code, since all filed copies can be examined by the public, computer software proprietors 
did not want their programs available to be easily read by their competitors. When a 
copy of the source code program is unavailable, or the proprietor is unwilling to file it in 
source code, the Copyright Office will accept the object code program as the registered 
copy to be filed "upon receipt of a letter from the applicant that the work as deposited 
contains copyrightable authorship ... [i.e.) that the work is original and not a copy of 
someone else's program." [d. If the object code is filed, the Copyright Office applies their 
Rule of Doubt to the program. [d. The Copyright Office has special procedures to pre-
vent someone from viewing the source code in its entirety, such as blocking out every 
third program instruction. 
36. Act of December 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (1980) [hereinafter 
cited as the 1980 Amendment); for a discussion of its passage through Congress, see 
Keplinger, supra note 30, at 502. 
37. 1980 Amendment, supra note 36, at 3028 (codified in 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1980». 
See supra note 13, for CONTU's definition of a computer program. 
38. 1980 Amendment, supra note 36, at 3028 (codified in 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1980». 
See infra text accompanying note 65, where the Third Circuit in Franklin found that the 
language of new section 117 indicates that programs are to be copyrightable. 714 F.2d 
1240, 1248 (3rd Cir. 1983). 
New section 117 allows program copyowners to make certain program modifications 
and back-up copies for operational and archival purposes, and clarifies transfer provi-
sions and rights when an owner of a copyrighted work leases, sells, or transfers his pro-
gram and any additional copies that were made from it. New section 117 reads: 
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, it is not an in-
fringement for the owner of a copy of a computer program to 
make or authorize the making of another copy or adaptation 
of that computer program provided: 
(1) that such a new copy or adaptation is created as an es-
sential step in the utilization of the computer program in con-
junction with a machine and that it is used in no other man-
ner, or (2) that such new copy or adaptation is for archival 
purposes only and that all archival copies are destroyed in the 
event that continued possession of the computer program 
should cease to be rightful. 
Any exact copies prepared in accordance with the provisions 
of this section may be leased, sold, or otherwise transferred, 
along with the copy from which such copies were prepared, 
only as part of the lease, sale, or other transfer of all rights in 
the program. Adaptations so prepared may be transferred only 
with the authorization of the copyright owner. 
17 U.S.C. § 117 (1980). 
See Boorstyn, Copyrights, Computers and Confusion, 63 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'y 276 
9
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debate its acceptance of CONTU's recommendations as an 
amendment to the Cbpyright Act, but found that CONTU's rec-
ommendations clarified the 1976 Act with respect to programs 
and thereby eliminated confusion on the legal status of com-
puter software.39 CONTU's majority position accordingly reveals 
the legislative intent behind the 1980 Amendment - that all 
computer programs be explicitly considered the proper subject 
matter of copyright.40 
However, it was unnecessary to amend the statutory lan-
guage to list computer programs as copyrightable works; they 
were already copyrightable under the 1976 Act for three rea-
sons.41 First, the legislature expressly considered a computer 
program to be included within the definition of a "literary 
work," one of the seven categories of copyrightable "works of 
authorship. "42 Second, the doctrine of White-Smith Publishing 
(1981), in which the author points out that the language of new section 117 is confusing. 
The section only extends the right to make a copy or adaptation to the "owner" of a 
program copy, whereby the owner must destroy the archival copy or adaptation when use 
of the purchased copy ceases to be "rightful." It is unclear under what circumstances the 
owner of the program copy may acquire possession of the program itself and how that 
possession could become wrongful. As well, only the archival copy is required to be de-
stroyed, but the "use" copy, which may have been made to assist the purchased copy in 
running within the computer, is not required to be destroyed. The reason for this dis-
tinction is not explained. Furthermore, a distinction is drawn between "exact" copies 
and adaptations. Under new section 117 "exact" copies can only be transferred when all 
rights in the owners purchased copy are transferred. This requirement is to prevent the 
sale of the owned copy while the exact copy of it is retained and used to make additional 
copies. This is in conflict with 17 U.S.C. section 109(a), which authorizes the owner of a 
copy to sell or otherwise dispose of copies. It would seem logical to assume that the 
owner may not sell the owned copy and keep the exact copy for use, even in view of 
section 109(a), but this is not made clear. Adaptations, on the other hand, are transfera-
ble, but only with the copyright owner's approval. See also, NIMMER, TREATISE ON THE 
LAW OF LITERARY, MUSICAL AND ARTISTIC PROPERTY, AND THE PROTECTION OF IDEAS, Sec-
tion 8.08 Limitations on the Reproduction Right-Computer Uses 8-103-8-110 (1983). 
39. 126 CONGo REc. S30365 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 1980) (statement of Rep. Bayh); 126 
CONGo REC. S30366 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 1980) (statement of Rep. Dole); 126 CONGo REC. 
H29895 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 1980) (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier). 
40. CONTU Report, supra note 2, at 12. 
41. See H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 51-54, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE 
CONGo & AD. NEWS 5659, 5664-68; S. REP. No. 473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 50-54 (1975), for 
the legislative language which supports this. 
42. The term "literary works" does not connote any criterion of 
literary merit or qualitative value; it includes, catalogs, direc-
tories, and similar factual, reference, or instructional works 
and compilations of data. It also includes computer data ba-
ses, and computer programs to the extent that they incorpo-
rate authorship in the progranlmer's expression of original 
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Co. v. Apollo CO.,43 requiring that copyrightable works be eye-
readable, was abrogated44 and the wording of the Act was 
changed to read that copyright protection subsists in works that 
can be "perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, ei-
ther directly or with the aid of a machine or device. "U Thus, 
even if a computer program was permanently stored in the com-
puter on a ROM chip, and was therefore not directly eye-read-
able, it still could receive copyright approval on the basis that it 
"could be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated" 
with the aid of an output device, such as a terminal screen or a 
printer.46 Finally, a computer program meets the two require-
ments of the 1976 Act which allows a work to be copyrighted, for 
ideas, as distinguished from the ideas themselves. 
H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 54, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. 
NEWS 5659, 5667. 
43. 209 U.S. 1 (1908) (hereinafter cited as White-Smith]. In the White-Smith case, a 
pianola roll, which reproduced a copyrighted musical composition on the piano, was held 
by the United States Supreme Court not to constitute copyright infringement. The 
Court explained that in order for the copyrighted work to be protected under the copy-
right laws, the pianola roll copy must be in a form that can be perceived and understood 
by the human eye. [d. at 17-18. 
44. The language of the 1976 Act was "intended to avoid the artificial and largely 
unjustifiable distinctions, derived from cases such as White-Smith Publishing Co. v. 
Apollo Co . .... " H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 52, reprinted in 1976 U.S. 
CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 5659, 5665; S. Rep. No. 473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 52 (1975). It 
is worth noting that the Copyright Act of 1909 partially reversed White-Smith by al-
lowing copyright for "parts of musical instruments serving to reproduce mechanically the 
musical work." Maggs, Some Problems 01 Legal Protection 01 Programs lor Microcom-
puter Control Systems, No.2 U. ILL. L.F. 453, 461 (1979). 
45. H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 44, at 52, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONGo & 
AD. NEWS at 5665; S. REP. NI? 473, supra note 44, at 52. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) reads: 
"(a) Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original works of 
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now knOWD or later. developed, 
from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either di-
rectly or with the aid of a machine or device .... " 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1976). 
Note that all published works must bear a copyright notice that can be " 'visually 
perceived' either directly or with the aid of a machine or device." 17 U.S.C. § 401(a) 
(1976). Although prior to the 1976 Act only published works could be registered with the 
Copyright Office, today unpublished computer programs and programs of limited publi-
cation which do not bear copyright notice can be registered and protected by the Federal 
Copyright Act as long as they are fixed in a tangible medium of expression. 17 U.S.C. §§ 
301(a), 405(a) (1976). 
46. The legislature goes on to say that "it makes no difference what the form, man-
ner, or medium of fixation may be, whether it is in words, in numbers, notes, sounds, 
pictures, or any other graphic or symbolic indicia, whether embodied in a physical object 
in written, printed, photographic, sculputural, punched, magnetic, or any other stable 
form, and whether it is capable of perception directly or by means of any machine or 
device 'now knOWD or later developed.''' H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 41, at 52; S. 
REP. No. 473, supra note 41, at 51. 
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it is an "original work of authorship" when the programmer or-
ders and arranges the program's instructions,47 and it is "fixed in 
a tangible medium of expression" when it is imprinted on a 
ROM chip or another type of storage device.48 The Third Circuit 
in Franklin accepted this reading of the Copyright Act when it 
held that all computer programs were copyrightable.49 The fol-
lowing discussion explains how the court came to this 
conclusion. 
II. DISCUSSION OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT'S OPINION IN FRANKLIN 
A. Background 
In Franklin, the defendant had copied fourteen of Apple's 
operating programs on ROM and on floppy disks and had used 
the programs in its ACE 100 microcomputer. This allowed 
Franklin to manufacture and sell its ACE 100 with the capabil-
ity of running Apple's application software, as well as the vast 
quantity of application software written by third parties for the 
Apple computer. GO 
The district court denied Apple a preliminary injunction 
against Franklin, finding that Apple had not made the requisite 
showing of a likelihood of success on the merits,GI to wit, there 
remained "some doubt" as to the copyrightability of the pro-
grams.GlI Furthermore, it stated that to grant the preliminary in-
junction would have caused irreparable harm to Franklin which 
would exceed any injury suffered by Apple during litigation 
since the marketing and selling of "Apple-compatible" com~ 
puters was Franklin's only business.63 
Apple moved the district court for reconsideration of its de-
47. Originality simply means that the author has not copied the expression from 
another. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 250 (1903). 
48. See supra note 45, for the language of section 102(a). See supra note 12 and text 
accompanying notes 23-29, for a discussion on storage devices. 
49. See infra text accompanying notes 59-72. 
50. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corporation, 714 F.2d 1240, 1242-45 
(3rd Cir. 1983). Because Franklin did not have operating program development costs 
while its computer could run all the same software as Apple's, Franklin could undercut 
Apple on the price of its microcomputers. [d. at 1254. 
51. 545 F. Supp. 812, 812 (E.D. Pa. 1982). See also, 714 F.2d at 1242. 
52. 545 F. Supp. at 812. See also, 714 F.2d at 1246. 
53. 545 F. Supp. at 825. See also, 714 F.2d at 1246. 
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cision in light of the Third Circuit's opinion in Williams Elec-
tronics, Inc. v. Artic International, Inc."" The Williams case, 
which was decided three days after the district court's decision, 
held that object code programs in ROM were copyrightable.DII 
Upon denial of its reconsideration motion, Apple appealed from 
the district court's opinion.1I6 The Third Circuit held that the 
district court's denial of Apple's preliminary injunction against 
Franklin was unwarranted since the district court proceeded 
under an erroneous view of applicable law.1I7 In coming to this 
conclusion, the Third Circuit presented four legal issues which 
will be discussed below. 
B. The Third Circuit Decision in Franklin 
1. A Computer Program Expressed in Object Code is 
Copyrightable 
The Third Circuit stated that apart from a lack of a statu-
tory basis for a finding that object code programs were not copy-
rightable, its decision in Williams had "laid to rest many of the 
doubts expressed by the district COurt."IIS A program expressed 
in object code was viewed as copyrightable for it was· considered 
to meet section 102's requirement that a copyrightable work be 
an "original work of authorship" and "fixed in [a] tangible me-
dium of expression. "119 
54. 714 F.2d at 1245. Williams, 685 F.2d 870 (3rd Cir. 1982). 
55. 685 F.2d at 876-77. In Williams, the defendant had copied plaintiff's object code 
programs in ROM. Williams brought suit against Artic for infringing upon Williams' 
copyrights in the audiovisual display of the video game "DEFENDER," and in the 
game's object code program in ROM. [d. at 871. 
56. 714 F.2d at 1245. 
57. [d. at 1242. Accord Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula International, Inc., 562 F. 
Supp. 775, 785 (C.D. Cal. 1983), aff'd, No. 83-5785, slip op. (9th Cir. Feb. 8, 1984). 
58. [d. at 1247. Accord, Formula, 562 F. Supp. at 785. 
59. 714 F.2d at 1247. Accord, Williams, 685 F.2d at 877; Tandy, 524 F. Supp. 171, 
173 (N.D. Cal. 1981). 
The Third Circuit in Franklin then cited the following sections of the 1976 Act: 
"Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original works of author-
ship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from 
which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or 
with the aid of a machine or device." 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1976). 
" 'Literary works' are works, other than audiovisual works, expressed in words, numbers, 
or other verbal or numerical symbols or indicia, regardless of the nature of the material 
objects, such as books, periodicals, manuscripts, phonorecords, film, tapes, disks, or 
cards, in which they are embodied." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976). 
A work is "fixed" in a tangible medium of expression when its 
13
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A program in object code is a "work of authorship," because 
in passing the 1976 Act the legislature considered it within the 
category of "literary works. "60 A literary work was defined in 
section 101 as a work that can be expressed not only in words, 
but in " 'numbers or other ... numerical symbols or indicia.' "61 
The court also pointed to the legislative history which con-
firmed that computer programs were copyrightable under the 
1980 Amendment.62 The Third Circuit examined the CONTU 
Report and noted that CONTU had recommended that copy-
right law be amended explicitly to allow computer programs to 
be copyrightable.63 Congress then enacted the 1980 Amendment 
to include CONTU's recommendations, these being a definition 
of a computer program and the repeal and replacement of sec-
tion 117.64 The court went on to say that since section 117 had 
been repealed and replaced with entirely new language providing 
rightful possessors of copies of computer programs with the 
right to adapt the copies for their own use, "the language. . . by 
carving out an exception to the normal proscriptions against 
copying, clearly indicate[d] that programs [were] copyrightable 
and [were] otherwise afforded copyright protection. "811 The 
Third Circuit reiterated that they had considered the issue of 
. copyright protection for computer programs in Williams and 
concluded that the " 'copyrightability of computer programs is 
firmly established after the 1980 Amendment to the Copyright 
Act.' "88 
Next, the Third Circuit pointed out that a· program in ob-
embodiment in a copy or phonorecord, by or under authority 
of the author, is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it 
to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a 
period of more than transitory duration. A work consisting of 
sounds, images, or both, that are being transmitted, is "fixed" 
for purposes of this title if a fixation of the work is being made 
simultaneously with its transmission. 
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976). 
60. 714 F.2d at 1247. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
61. 714 F.2d at 1249. Accord, Williams, 685 F.2d at 875; Tandy, 524 F. Supp. at 173. 
See supra note 59, for this quotation within the statutory definition of a literary work. 
62. 714 F.2d at 1247-1248. 
63. 714 F.2d at 1247. See CONTU Report, supra note 2, at 1. 
64. 714 F.2d at 1247. See notes 36-38 and accompanying text, where the legislature 
adopted CONTU's recommendations. 
65. 714 F.2d at 1248. 
66. [d. See, Williams, 685 F.2d at 875. 
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ject code does not have to be eye-readable or serve a communi-
cative function by being designed to be read by a human 
reader.67 The legislature had abrogated the doctrine of White-
Smith68 and had changed the statutory language of the 1976 Act 
to read that a work in any tangible medium of expression need 
only be "perceived . .. with the aid of a machine or device."69 
Finally, the court found that the language adopted by the 
legislature in the 1980 Amendment to define a computer pro-
gram as a set of instructions to be used directly or indirectly in 
a computer in order to bring about a certain result, makes it 
clear that a program in object code is intended to be copyright-
able under the Copyright Act, for the object code is what is used 
directly by the computer in order to bring about the result.70 
2. A Computer Program Embedded in ROM is 
Copyrightable 
The Third Circuit reaffirmed its conclusion in Williams that 
the embodiment of a program in ROM does nothing more than 
satisfy the statutory requirement that a copyrightable work be 
fixed in some tangible medium of expression, for once a program 
is "fixed," it can be "perceived, reproduced, or otherwise com-
municated" with the aid of the computer.71 When a program is 
placed onto a ROM chip in order to control the activity of the 
machine, it therefore does not become a utilitarian object and 
part of the computer.7S Accordingly, the Third Circuit reasserted 
67. 714 F.2d at 1248. 
68. See supra note 43-44 and accompanying text, for an explanation of the case and 
the legislative language used to abrogate the White-Smith doctrine. 
69. 714 F.2d at 1248. Accord, Williams, 685 F.2d at 877; Tandy, 524 F. Supp. at 173. 
Please note that courts have also applied this reasoning when addressing whether an 
object code program in ROM can be considered a "copy" under section 101. 1'he ROM is 
the "copy" for it is a "material object" in which a work such as an object code program 
can be "fixed" and from which the program can be "perceived, reproduced, or otherwise 
communicated" with the aid of the computer. Id. 
70. 714 F.2d at 1248. Accord Midway Manufacturing Co. v. Strohon, 564 F. Supp. 
741, 750 (N.D. Ill. 1983). See supra note 13, for the legislative definition of a computer 
program. 
71. 714 F.2d at 1249. Accord, Williams, 685 F.2d at 874; Tandy, 524 F. Supp. at 173. 
See supra note 59, for section 102(a) of the 1976 Act. 
72. 714 F.2d at 1249. Accord, Williams, 685 F.2d at 876; Tandy, 524 F. Supp. at 173. 
See infra text accompanying note 107-108, where it is explained where such a proposi-
tion first arose. 
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its holding in Williams that programs in object code embedded 
in ROM are the proper subject of copyright by meeting the stat-
utory requirements of section 102. 
3. Computer Operating Programs are Copyrightable 
The Third Circuit stated that whether operating programs, 
as distinguished from application programs, were the proper 
subject of copyright addressed the "heart" of Franklin's argu-
ment since the issue previously had not been raised before the 
COurt.78 Franklin contended that operating programs were per se 
uncopyrightable under the principles of Baker v. Selden, as 
codified in section 102(b) of the Copyright Act.74 The Third Cir-
cuit viewed Franklin's argument as consisting of two principle 
points: First, that copyright protection extends to only the ex-
pression of an "idea," "process," "system," or "method of opera-
tion" and not to the use of the system itself or to purely utilita-
rian uses. Second, that copyright law can be used only to obtain 
a monopoly over the expression of an idea and not over the idea 
itself. 711 
"Process," "System," or "Method of Operation" 
The court agreed with Franklin that the case of Baker v. 
73. 714 F.2d at 1249. Although part of the program in Williams was an operating 
program, the issue as to its copyrightability as such was not raised or considered by the 
Third Circuit. [d. 
74. 714 F.2d at 1250. In Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879), a "peculiar" system of 
bookkeeping was set down in a book, including illustrating forms with which to imple-
ment the bookkeeping system. The defendant published forms slightly different than 
plaintiff's but which accomplished the same results. The United States Supreme Court 
held that copyright protection only extended to the written description in the books, the 
expression, and not to the actual implementation and use of the bookkeeping methods 
described, these being ideas. In Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954), reh'g denied, 
347 U.S. 949 (1954), the Court restated the rule of Baker v. Selden, explaining that copy-
right infringement can only occur when the expression of another's idea is copied and 
not when the underlying idea itself has been used. Accord, Franklin, 714 F.2d at 1252. In 
Mazer, the Court held that the patentability of a lamp, the base of which was a statu-
ette, does not bar copyright as ~ the work of art, the statuette itself. 347 U.S. 201, 217 
(1954). 
Section 102(b) reads: "In no case does copyright protection for an original work ex-
tend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or 
discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or em-
bodied in such work." 17 U.S.C. section 102(b) (1976). 
75. 714 F.2d at 1250. 
16
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 14, Iss. 2 [1984], Art. 3
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol14/iss2/3
1984] SOFTWARE PROTECTION 297 
Selden and section l02(b) prohibit copyrighting an "idea," "pro-
cess," "system," or "method of operation;" however, it is only 
the programmer's written instructions which Apple sought to 
have protected and not the actual method which instructs the 
computer to perform its operating instructions.78 An operating 
program does not itself become a method or process simply be-
cause its instructions may be used to activate the operation of 
the computer. For example, the instructions in a book may de-
scribe the steps needed to activate a machine, but this does not 
make the book's instructions the actual process which the ma-
chine goes through in order to run.77 Furthermore, if an operat-
ing program could become a method or process merely because 
it instructs the computer to carry out various processes,78 then 
both application and operating programs would be uncopyright-
able since they both instruct the computer to do something; an 
application program may instruct the computer to prepare a tax 
return, while an operating program may instruct the computer 
to translate source code into object code.79 Thus, the court found 
that Franklin's reasoning was inconsistent with its own proposi-
tion that only application programs were copyrightable. The 
court concluded that there was no reason to afford less copyright 
protection to operating programs.80 
In addition, the court reiterated the conclusion it reached in 
the object code context that the mere fact that a program is 
fixed in ROM and stored within the CPU does not make it a 
utilitarian object and part of the machine itself.81 The court dis-
cussed Franklin's contention further by pointing out that an op-
erating program can be fixed in any storage device outside the 
76. [d. at 1250-51. Accord, Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula International, Inc., No. 
83-5875, slip op. (9th Cir. Feb. 8, 1984). The Franklin court states that "the method 
would be protected, if at all, by the patent law, an issue as yet unresolved [by) Diamond 
v. Diehr." [d. See supra note 7, where this is also pointed out as a reason to find copy-
right a more effective means of protection. 
77. 714 F.2d at 1251. 
78. [d. 
79. [d. In Formula, the district court pointed out that it is the purpose of all com-
puter programs to operate the computer in such a way as to "ultimately produce some 
useful communication to the user," whether the program directly communicates with the 
user or "merely direct[s) certain machine functions which eventually result in that ex-
pression." 562 F. Supp. 775, 780 (C.D. Cal. 1983), aff'd, No. 83-5875, slip op. (9th Cir. 
Feb. 8, 1984). 




Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1984
298 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 14:281 
CPU, such as on floppy disk or magnetic tape, and can be read-
ily called into RAM in order to be read by the CPU.82 The Third 
Circuit rejected Franklin's expansive reading of Baker v. Selden 
that when a copyrightable work is put to a utilitarian use, such 
as to instruct a computer to carry out various operations, the 
work will have its copyright invalidated.83 The court found such 
a reading to have been explicitly rejected by the United States 
Supreme Court, Congress and CONTU.8. 
Thus, the Third Circuit applied the above analysis and 
found Apple's computer programs to be the proper subject of 
copyright.811 The court, however, needed to address one more 
question raised by Franklin - would the extension of copyright 
protection to Apple's operating programs allow Apple to obtain 
and hold a monopoly over ideas? 
Idea/Expression Dichotomy 
As the court pointed out, the legislative history indicates 
that section 102(b) was intended" 'to make clear that the ex-
pression adopted by the programmer is the copyrightable ele-
ment in a computer program, and that the actual processes or 
methods embodied in the program are not within the scope of 
the copyright law.' "88 Therefore, the court rejected any reading 
of section l02(b) which would enlarge or contract the scope of 
copyright protection beyond that set out in Baker v. Selden: 
patent law protects the idea or process while copyright protects 
only the expression of that idea.87 
Since the line between the expression of an idea and the 
82. [d. See supra text accompanying notes 11-29 for a description of these computer 
concepts. 
83. 714 F.2d at 1251. Accord, Formula, 562 F. Supp. at 784. 
84. 714 F.2d at 1251-52. The court cited Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 218 (1954) to 
support this conclusion. Congress was considered to have accepted this view, since it 
wrote into law CONTU's recommendations exactly as given. 
85. 714 F.2d at 1254. The Third Circuit Court in Franklin cited Formula, 562 F. 
Supp. 775 (C.D. Cal. 1982), aff'd, No. 83-5875, slip op. (9th Cir. Feb. 8, 1984), as reaching 
the same conclusion, and noted that although not discussing the issue, Tandy, 525 F. 
Supp. 171 (N.D. Cal. 1981), and GCA Corp. v. Chance, 217 U.S.P.Q. 718 (N.D. Cal. July 
12, 1982) both dealt with operating programs where the courts upheld the plaintiff's 
copyrights. [d. at 1252. 
86. 714 F.2d at 1252-53. 
87. [d. at 1252. Accord, Formula, 562 F. Supp. at 780. 
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idea itself is difficult to draw, -the court recommended that any 
line drawn in regard to operating programs be a pragmatic one 
which balances the need for competition with the security of 
patent and copyright protection.88 The court stated that the es-
sential inquiry must be whether the expression and the idea 
have merged. If there are only one or two ways to express an 
idea so that to protect the expression will have the effect of pro-
tecting the idea itself, then the line between an idea and its ex-
pression have merged and copyright protection will be denied.89 
The court made the line dependent upon a factual determina-
tion particular to each specific computer program at issue and 
not to all operating programs in general.90 Therefore, the Third 
Circuit remanded a determination of this issue in regard to Ap-
ple's operating programs.91 
In addition, as long as Apple's operating programs could be 
written in more than one or two ways which would instruct the 
computer to carry out its process, the question of whether a pro-
gram would achieve total compatibility with third party Apple-
compatible application software was a commercial objective 
which was not to be considered by the district court in making 
an idea/expression merger determination.92 If "[t]he idea of one 
of the operating system programs is, for example, how to trans-
late source code into object code ... [and] other methods of 
expressing that idea are not foreclosed as a practical matter, 
then there is no merger. "93 
The Third Circuit concluded that as a matter of law all 
computer programs were the proper subject of copyright, and 
the district court's denial of Apple's preliminary injunction was 
88. 714 F.2d at 1253. 
89. [d. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula International, Inc. No. 83-5875 slip op. 
(9th Cir. 1984) where this language was relied upon by the Ninth Circuit. 
90. [d. 
91. [d. This determination will not be made since Franklin has settled with Apple 
Computer. San Jose Mercury News, Jan. 5, 1984, at I, col. 1. But see Apple Computer, 
Inc. v. Formula International, Inc., No. 8:~-5875, slip op. (9th Cir. Feb. 8, 1984) wherein 
Apple introduced uncontroverted evidence that numerous methods existed for writing 
operating programs. 
92. 714 F.2d at 1253. See, Formula, 562 F. Supp. at 782, where the district court 
found that there were numerous ways in which the operating programs could be written 
that allowed them to be "98% compatible" with the Apple computer, without the need 
by the defendant to write or copy the same program which Apple had copyrighted. [d. 
93. 714 F.2d at 1253. 
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due to an erroneous view of copyright law.9• Furthermore, since 
the procedural standard used by the district court to deny the 
preliminary injunction was viewed as inappropriate, the Third 
Circuit set out the correct considerations that were to be made 
when granting or denying a preliminary injunction in regard to 
the copyright law of computer software.9G 
4. The Requirement of a Presumption of Irreparable 
Harm 
The Third Circuit found that the district court had failed to 
consider the prevailing view that only a presumption of irrepara-
ble harm is required to obtain a preliminary injunction. This can 
be made either through a showing of a prima facie case of copy-
right infringement or a reasonable likelihood of success on the 
merits.98 
The Third Circuit suggested that even without this gener-
ally applied presumption, whenever large expenditures of time 
and money, such as Apple had invested in developing its operat-
ing programs, is placed in jeopardy by the competitive advan-
tage gained by an infringer such as Franklin, the irreparable 
harm requirement needed to support a preliminary injunction is 
satisfied.9 ? The standard "that the strength of the required 
showing of irreparable injury varies inversely with the strength 
of a plaintiff's showing of a likelihood of success on the merits" 
applies only when copying is minimal or conjectural, and not 
when copyrighted material essential to a plaintiff's operations is 
concededly copied.98 
The district court's finding that Apple had not suffered ir-
reparable harm based upon a determination that a preliminary 
injunction would have devasting effects on Franklin's business 
was unacceptable to the Third Circuit. If this were the standard, 
94. [d. at 1253-54. 
95. [d. at 1254. 
96. [d. 
97. [d. Apple had spent $740,000 on research and development (excluding the cost 
of creating or acquiring earlier versions of the programs "in suit" and marketing them) 
and it had taken forty-six "man-months" in order to produce the programs. [d. at 1244. 
See, Getting Tough on Software Theft, Bus. WK., May 1982, at 28, where it is stated 
that Apple had spent as much as $50 million on research and development. 
98. [d. at 1254. 
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a copyright infringer would structure his business so as to meet 
the test, whereby the size of the infringer's business would de-
termine the copyright holder's ability to receive prompt judicial 
redress.BB Consequently, the district court's denial of Apple's 
preliminary injunction was reversed and the case was remanded 
to the trial court for further determination on the trial issues 
involved in copyright proceedings.loo 
III. ANALYSIS 
By holding that all computer programs were copyrightable, 
the Third Circuit in Franklin has set an appellate court prece-
dent since previously only a handful of district courts had ruled 
on the matter. lOl Although these district courts ruled in favor of 
copyright protection, the district court in Franklin had held the 
converse. l02 While the Third Circuit's decision reaffirmed its 
opinion in Williams, this was only in finding that object code 
programs in ROM were copyrightable. loa Thus, the Franklin de-
cision was a higher court ruling in which all arguments against 
the copyrightability of computer programs were put to rest. 
The opinion is of extreme importance to the computer 
software industry, for had the Third Circuit in Franklin af-
firmed the district court's decision, copyright protection for 
computer programs would have become senseless. First, pro-
grams are often manufactured, sold, and used while they are em-
bedded in ROM in their object code form and, without copyright 
protection, many of the programs on the market could be copied 
freely.lo. Second, the exclusion of all operating programs from 
protection would have diminished the certainty of protection for 
99. Id. at 1255. 
100.Id. 
101. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula International, Inc., 562 F. Supp. 775 (C.D. 
Cal. 1983), aff'd, No. 83-5875, slip op. (9th Cir. Feb. 8, 1984); Hubco Data Products Corp. 
v. Management Assistance, Inc., 219 U.S.P.Q. 450 (D. Idaho Feb. 3, 1983) (finding that 
operating programs are copyrightable); Midway Manufacturing Co. v. Strahan, 564 F. 
Supp. 741 (N.D. Ill. 1983); GCA Corp. v. Chance, 217 U.S.P.Q. 718 (N.D. Cal. July 12, 
1984); Tandy Corp. v. Personal Micro Computers, Inc., 524 F. Supp. 171 (N.D. Cal. 
1981), (finding that programs embedded in ROM and object code programs are 
copyrightable). 
102. 545 F. Supp. 812, 812 (E.D. Pa. 1982), rev'd, 714 F.2d 1240 (3rd Cir. 1983). 
103. See supra text accompanying note 58. 
104. "[I]f many technical predictions are correct most software may one day take 
this form [object code program in ROM]." Koch, supra note 30, at 353. 
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application programs since there is no definitive line between 
the two types.10& As a consequence of the Third Circuit's reversal 
of the district court's opinion in Franklin, current law provides 
that all computer programs are copyrightable, no matter what 
the type or form. 108 
The Third Circuit's conclusion that object code programs in 
ROM are copyrightable followed a line of reasoning set down by 
the majority of courts which have dealt with the issue. The argu-
ment first arose in Data Cash Systems, Inc. v. JS&A Group, 
Inc./O? where an Illinois district court stated in dictum that the 
1976 Act must be interpreted to apply to a program only in its 
source code phase, since an object code program when embedded 
in ROM was a machine part engaged in the computer to be an 
essential part of the mechanical process.108 The district court in 
Franklin adopted this reasoning even though commentators and 
the courts had viewed this dictum to be inaccurate and to have 
been overruled on appeal by the Seventh Circuit, where the 
court had stated that neither party briefed this issue nor de-
fended it on appeal.10e Thus, the Third Circuit's conclu-
sion-that an object code program when embedded in ROM 
does nothing more than satisfy the statutory requirement of 
fixation - reaffirms the view previous courts and CONTU have 
105. See infra notes 78-79 and accompanying text. 
106. For these cases see Franklin, 714 F.2d 1240 (3rd Cir. 1983); Williams, 685 F.2d 
870 (3rd Cir. 1982), and supra note 101. 
107. 480 F. Supp. 1063 (N.D. Ill. 1979), aft'd on other grounds, 628 F.2d 1038 (7th 
Cir. 1980) [hereinafter cited as Data Cash]. The plaintiff had manufactured a hand-held 
computer chess game which had a built-in object code program in ROM. The defendant, 
according to the court, duplicated the plaintiff's ROM chip and began selling its version 
of a hand-held computer chess game. 
108. [d. at 1065-66. 
109. 628 F.2d at 1038, 1041 (7th Cir. 1980). For the authorities which found the case 
overruled see, Formula, 562 F. Supp. 775, 784-85 (C.D. Cal. 1983), aft'd, No. 83-5875, slip 
. op. (9th Cir. Feb. 8, 1984); Williams, 685 F.2d 870, 877 (3rd Cir. 1982); Midway Mfg. Co. 
v. Artic International, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 999,1012-13 (N.D. Ill. 1982), aft'd, 704 F.2d 
1009 (7th Cir 1983) (where the court expressly discounted the reasoning of its own dis-
trict court in Data Cash); Atari, Inc. v. North Am. Phillips Consumer Electronics Corp., 
672 F.2d 607, 617 (7th Cir. 1982); GCA Corporation v. Chance, 217 U.S.P.Q. 718 (N.D. 
Cal. July 12,1982); Tandy, 524 F. Supp. 171, 175 (N.D. Cal. 1981); Boorstyn, Copyrights, 
Computers and Confusion, 63 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 276 (1981); Bigelow, Federal Court 
Rules Radio Shack ROM Can Be Protected Under Copyright Law, 8 COMPUTER LAW AND 
TAX REPORT, Oct. 1981, at I, 2; Rose, supra note 40, at 565; Root, supra note 30, at 222. 
See NIMMER, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF LITERARY, MUSICAL AND ARTISTIC PROPERTY, AND 
THE PROTECTION OF IDEAS, Section 2.08 [c] [3] (1978), for an explanation of utilitarian 
objects. 
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reached.110 It is an accurate assessment considering that an ob-
ject code program is separable from the ROM device which 
holds it and that it is placed onto the ROM only to fix the pro-
gram in a tangible medium of expression. 
From an examination of the copyrightability of computer 
programs under the 1976 Act,111 it is clear that the Third Circuit 
is accurate in its conclusion that a program in object code meets 
the two statutory requirements of section 102(a).I12 An object 
code program is an "original work of authorship" for it is a "lit-
erary work" and it is "fixed in a tangible medium of expression" 
when placed onto the ROM device, where it can be perceived, 
reproduced, or otherwise communicated with the aid of the com-
puter. The court's analysis was similar to that of the Northern 
California district court in Tandy Corp. u. Personal Micro Com-
puter,118 where it had been adopted by a majority of the courts 
which have decided the issue.u • The court in Tandy stated that 
110. See CONTU Report, supra note 2, at 21; Williams, 685 F.2d at 876; Midway 
Mfg. Co. v. Strohon, 564 F. Supp. at 750; Tandy, 524 F. Supp. at 173. 
111. See supra text accompanying notes 41-48. 
112. 714 F.2d at 1253-54. 
113. 524 F. Supp. 171 (N.D. Cal. 1981). In Tandy, the defendant was alleged to have 
duplicated the plaintiff's computer program for an input-output routine (an operations 
software program) which was embodied on a ROM chip. The defendants read out the 
program, copied it, and then placed the program in their computers for distribution and 
sale. See supra note 69 for the reasoning used in Tandy. 
114. Williams, 685 F.2d 870 (3rd Cir. 1982); Midway Manufacturing Co. v. Strohon, 
564 F. Supp. 741 (N.D. Ill. 1983); GCA Corp. v. Chance, 217 U.S.P.Q. 718 (N.D. Cal. July 
12, 1982). See Stern Electronics, Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852 (2nd Cir. 1982); Midway 
Mfg. Co. v. Artic International, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 999 (N.D. Ill. 1982), aff'd, 704 F.2d 
1009 (7th Cir. 1983), petition for cert. filed No. 82-1992; Midway Mfg. Co. v. 
Dirkschneider, 543 F. Supp. 466 (D. Neb. 1981); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Bandai-America, 
Inc., 546 F. Supp. 125 (D. N.J. 1982); Atari, Inc. v. Amusement World, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 
222 (D. Md. 1981); Atari, Inc. v. N. Am. Philips Consumer Electronics Corp., 672 F.2d 
607 (1982); Nintendo of America, Inc. v. Elcon Industries, Inc., 564 F. Supp. 937 (E.D. 
Mich. 1982). In these cases the video games' audiovisual displays were found to be copy-
rightable because the games' object code programs in ROM met the statutory require-
ments of copyrightability by being original works of authorship and fixed in a tangible 
medium of expression. The object code program was seen as a "copy" under section 101, 
for the ROM was the "material object" in which the program was fixed; the audiovisual 
work was fixed because it was embodied in a copy which was sufficiently permanent or 
stable to permit the audiovisual work to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise commu-
nicated. Stern, 669 F.2d at 855-56. Although a game's audiovisual display varies each 
time it is played depending on the moves of the player, an audiovisual display is an 
"original work of authorship" since the content of the audiovisual display is not affected 
by the participation of the player but is determined by the object code program in ROM. 
669 F.2d at 856. The audiovisual display is not composed simply of reappearing features 
determined by the computer program, but the audiovisual display that appears is an 
23
Nussbaum: Software Protection
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1984
304 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 14:281 
"any other interpretation would render the theoretical ability to 
copyright computer programs virtually meaningless."llG 
In addition to finding object code programs copyrightable 
under the 1976 Act, the Third Circuit interpreted the 1980 
Amendment's definition of a computer program in order to reaf-
firm the copyrightability of object code programs. ll8 In so doing, 
the court used a more expansive application of the Amendment 
than previous courts. Previously, new section 117 and the legis-
lative definition of a computer program had been viewed simply 
as a clarification of legislative intent to include computer pro-
grams as copyrightable under the 1976 Act. 
As a consequence of reversing the district court and reaf-
firming its position in Williams, the Third Circuit established a 
uniform rule of law for the copyrightability of object code pro-
grams in ROM. This result is consistent with the CONTU Re-
port and legislative intent allowing for an expansive application 
of copyright law to computer programs.ll7 
Prior to the district court's opinion in Franklin, distinctions 
between operating programs and application programs had not 
been made. Although some courts, in the course of deciding the 
copyrightability of object code programs, had previously upheld 
copyrights in operating programs, there was only one district 
court case which had specifically dealt with the issue. In Apple 
original variation of the computer program, thereby allowing the audiovisual display to 
be copyrighted separately from the computer program. 669 F.2d at 856. 
The National Law Journal, Aug. 1, 1983, at 44, col. 1, points out potential problems 
with relying solely upon the copyright in a game's program: the same audio displays may 
be generated by different programs and software copyright cases are more expensive to 
prosecute than an audiovisual copyright case. It is wise then to copyright both the 
game's audiovisual display and the object code program in ROM. See id. for a history of 
video games and copyright. 
115. 524 F. Supp. at 175. The Third Circuit in Williams and the district court in 
GCA Corp. v. Chance, 217 U.S.P.Q. 718 (N.D. Cal. July 12, 1982), also came to this 
conclusion, but the GCA court based its decision upon a unique interpretation of the 
Copyright Act. The court found that since the "object code is the encryption of the copy-
righted source code, the two are to be treated as one work; therefore, copyright of the 
source code protects the object code as well." [d. at 720. Citing Tandy, the district court 
found the source code to fall within the protection of the copyright laws under the defi-
nition set out in section 102(a) of the 1976 Act. [d. 
116. See supra text accompanying note 70. 
117. See CONTU Report, supra note 2, at 1, and text accompanying notes 39-40. 
24
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 14, Iss. 2 [1984], Art. 3
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol14/iss2/3
1984] SOFTWARE PROTECTION 305 
Computer, Inc. v. Formula International, Inc.,lls the court 
adopted a similar analysis to that of the Third Circuit in Frank-
lin. The Formula court found that there was no statutory basis 
for a distinction between computer programs based .upon the 
function they serve within the machine. ll9 Like the Third Cir-
cuit, the Formula court had difficulty drawing a definitive line 
between the two types of programs.120 In Formula, section 
l02(b) was found to have been established not to limit the scope 
of copyright, but to make it clear that copyright protection ex-
tends only to the expression of an idea, as opposed to patent 
protection, which extends to the ideas themselves. This section 
does not in itself establish that an operating program is an 
"idea," "process/' "system," or "method of operation" simply 
because such a program controls the operation of the computer 
and does not directly produce any copyrightable output.l2l Both 
the Third Circuit and the district court in Formula found copy-
right protection for software to reflect Congressional "receptivity 
to new technology and its desire to encourage, through the copy-
right laws, continued imagination and creativity in computer 
programming. "l22 
If the courts had recognized the distinctions proposed by 
the defendants between operating programs and application pro- . 
grams, a result counter to that intended by the legislature would 
have been realized. Refusal to extend copyright protection to op-
erating programs would have severely limited protection to all 
computer programs since software technology advances rapidly 
and any distinctions placed upon computer programs would 
118. 562 F. Supp. 775 (C.D. Cal. 1983), afT'd, No. 83-5875, slip op. (9th Cir. Feb. 8, 
1984). The plaintiff in both the Franklin and the Formula cases was the same, the com-
plaints were identical, and both cases involved the same Apple ROMs and floppy disket-
tes, whereby both defendants were accused of copying them in the production of a com-
peting personal computer. [d. at 784. In Formula, the defendant manufactured and sold 
a computer kit under the trademark "Pineapple," that when assembled was virtually 
indistinguishable from Apple's Computer II in appearance and in its uses and capacities. 
Formula's kit and its peripheral devices contained Apple's operating programs in object 
code in ROM and on diskettes. See Hubco Data Products Corp. v. Management Assis-
tance, Inc., 219 U.S.P.Q. 450 (D. Idaho, Feb. 3, 1983) in which the court also found oper-
ating programs to be copyrightable. This. opinion came out during the period in which 
the Third Circuit was deciding the Franklin case, therefore, this opinion was not used in 
the court's determination of the issue. 
119. 562 F. Supp. at 780. 
120. [d. 
121. [d. 
122. Franklin, 714 F.2d at 1253-54; see also Formula, 562 F. Supp. at 783. 
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soon become even more difficult to ascertain. Without a clear 
judicial determination that all computer programs are copyright-
able, new distinctions would surely be proposed by copyright de-
fendants in efforts to limit copyright protection further. The 
Third Circuit apparently realized this problem and therefore not 
only disaffirmed any line being placed between types of com-
puter programs, but rejected the placement of any artificial line 
between ideas and the expression of those ideas.123 The idea/ex-
pression merger doctrine adopted by the court is the one that is 
usually applied in all copyright cases to each individual work. 
Therefore, computer programs will not be afforded any less pro-
tection than any other type of copyrightable work. 
The court's opinion contains an extremely broad characteri-
zation of the merger principle124 based upon the fact that there 
are numerous ways to write an operating program which can 
translate source code into object code within a particular com-
puter. In addition, the court made it clear that even if there are 
only one or two ways to arrange an operating program to make it 
compatible with certain application software, this is a commer-
cial objective which is not to be considered when making an 
idea/expression merger determinatiori.125 As a consequence, the 
Third Circuit has allowed the scope of copyright to reach its 
broadest possible potential in regard to the protection of com-
puter programs within the boundaries of the law as set out in 
the Copyright Act. The Third Circuit's approach appears to be 
in line with legislative intent to advance the development of 
computer programs by encouraging the programmer's effort 
through personal gain attained from the law of copyright. 
While the copyrightability of computer programs now ap-
pears to be settled, questions fundamental to copyright infringe-
ment cases generally may continue to pose barriers to program 
protection. Previous judicial decisions in the area of computer 
programs have dealt with the denial or grant of a preliminary 
injunction against the alleged infringer and, consequently, most 
judicial precedent has not dealt with fundamental infringement 
issues. However, the fact that the subject matter in question is a 
123. See supra text accompanying notes 88-90. 
124. See supra text accompanying note 93. 
125. See supra text accompanying note 92. 
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computer program should not keep one from a presentation of 
the same arguments that would be applied had the subject mat-
ter been any other work of authorship. The courts will apply the 
same judicial standards that apply to all other copyrightable 
works and the answer to any fundamental copyright issue which 
can arise in any copyright case will be based upon a factual de-
termination unique to that case.128 
It is yet to be seen whether other courts will apply as broad 
a definition as did the Third Circuit in Franklin in order to de-
cide whether an idea/expression merger issue pertains to a com-
puter program. But, because the courts tend to favor the protec-
tion of copyrightable works, there will probably be a 
nonrestrictive application of the law to all fundamental issues, 
which includes a broad definition of when an idea has merged 
with an expression. Since many courts have demonstrated that 
they understand computer concepts, broad copyright protection 
for computer programs will probably be enforced in the future. 
As the technology of computer software develops and changes, 
future courts must continue to apply the Copyright Act flexibly 
in conjunction with these judicial precedents in order to ensure 
growth and progress in this important field; this will lead to 
126. For example, was the defendant's infringement of the program justified under 
the doctrine of fair use? See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1976). Did the plaintiff properly affix a 
copyright notice to the program and register the program within the five-year statutory 
limitation period? See 17 U.S.C. § 405 (1976). Is there "substantial similarity" between 
the plaintiff's computer program and the alleged infringer's program? See Midway Man-
ufacturing Co. v. Strohon, 564 F. Supp. 741, 752 (N.D. Ill. 1983), where the court dealt 
with this issue. Once it was established that the defendant had access to plaintiff's video 
game ROMs, copying could be inferred if defendant's programs were "substantially simi-
lar" to plaintiff's. Defendant's programs contained all the same instructions used to di-
rect the movement of the game and some of the same directions to display messages on 
the video screen. Defendant's programs had similar storage requirements (number of 
"bytes" used). Eighty-nine percent of the defendant's program instructions were in the 
same sequential order as plaintiff's and, in isolation, ninety-nine percent of the program 
instructions were the same. Thus, the programs were considered by the court to be too 
substantially similar to have been independently created. In addition, plaintiff added 
certain information to the end of its programs which was not essential to program the 
game. Defendant's programs also had this information "patched on" to the end of its 
programs, which led the court to infer that the programs were copied. Id. 
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greater developments in the field of computers in general and 
consequently benefit society as a whole. 
Jan L. Nussbaum* 
• Second-year student, Golden Gate University School of Law. This comment is the 
first place entry from Golden Gate University School of Law to the forty-sixth annual 
Nathan Burkan Memorial Writing Competition, sponsored by the American Society of 
Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP). 
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